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IN RE SOLEDAD: THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S
JURISDICTION OVER FUNDS EARNED BY
BANKRUPT WHEN MULTIPLE GOVERNMENT
CLAIMANTS ASSERT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND A RIGHT TO SET-OFF
In In re Soledad the United States Government asserted a
"monolith theory" of sovereign immunity whereby one agency of
the government has the power and right to withhold and set-off a
bankrupt's earned but unpaid funds for the benefit of another
agency. This Comment analyzes the Government's claim beyond
the factual limitations of Soledad and introduces two series of
cases that respectively allow and deny the Government's claim.
The Comment concludes by examining the 1978 Bankruptcy Act,
discussing its effect upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
calling for the abrogation of the doctrine whenever the Govern-
ment holds property that belongs to the bankrupt estate.
During the years 1973, 1974, and 1975, Soledad Enterprises, Inc.,
entered into a series of eight contracts with the United States
Navy to perform various custodial maintenance and yard-care
functions at Navy bases in California. Soledad's performance of
each of the eight contracts was deficient. As a result of Soledad's
inability to perform adequately, the Navy took various remedial
actions, including self-help and reference to Soledad's surety.'
In late May and early June, 1975, the Navy terminated five of
the contracts for alleged defaults in performance. The three re-
maining contracts, completed by Soledad, became the subject of
various disputes. The principal issues concerned the inadequacy
of the work and Soledad's right to compensation under the con-
tracts. Soledad submitted its claim for funds earned but retained
1. In Financial Indemnity Co. v. Usery, No. 76-2439 (N.D. Cal., fied Nov. 2,
1976) (transferred to S.D. Cal., Feb. 23, 1978), Soledad's surety, Financial Indem-
nity Co., filed a separate lawsuit against the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary
of the Navy to cover its losses. The resolution of that case and the presence of Fi-
nancial Indemnity in In re Soledad are inconsequential to the issues this Com-
ment will examine. Therefore, all references and subissues relating to Financial
Indemnity have been omitted.
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by the Navy to a contracting officer pursuant to the disputes
clauses of the respective contracts. On August 4, 1977, the con-
tracting officer rendered his final decision. 2 The contracting of-
ficer deducted from the amounts earned both alleged
administrative costs incurred by the Navy and assessments for
unpaid wages by the Department of Labor.3
The Navy, as a branch of the executive department, declared
that it had the power to determine assessments and set-off claims
of other agencies within the executive department. However, on
May 13, 1975, more than two years prior to the contracting officer's
final decision and subsequent affirmation by the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals, Soledad had filed for bankruptcy.4
Soledad's trustee later filed a complaint 5 with the bankruptcy
court seeking the turnover of property held by the Navy consist-
ing of the earned but unpaid sums of money from the completed
contracts.
In answer to the turnover motion,6 the Navy filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of summary jurisdic-
2. Department of the Navy, Final Dec. No. 77-97 (Aug. 4, 1977):











3. The Navy withheld funds in contract nos. N62474-73-C-3484, N62474-74-C-
3235 and N62474-74-C-3236 pursuant to the Department of Labor request and in or-
der to satisfy partially a prior lien filed by the IRS.
4. In re Soledad Enterprises, No. 75-1354 (S.D. Cal. March 20, 1978).
5. On May 27, 1977, the trustee filed a complaint for turnover and restitution
with the bankruptcy court, Judge Herbert Katz presiding. See In re Soledad En-
terprises, No. 75-1354 (S.D. Cal. March 20, 1978).
6. A turnover motion consists of a written complaint which affirmatively al-
leges that the party to whom the motion is directed has the requisite possession
and control of the property and that such property is under the summary jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court. The turnover order, if issued by the bankruptcy
court, directs the adverse holder to "turn over" such property to the receiver or
trustee. The turnover proceeding is "essentially ... for restitution rather than in-
demnification, with some characteristics of a proceeding in rem; the primary con-
dition of relief is possession of existing chattels or their proceeds capable of being
surrendered by the person ordered to do so." Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 62-63
(1948).
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tion,7 submitting the contracting officer's final decision as evi-
dence of the Navy's adverse claim8 to the funds in question. The
issues facing the bankruptcy court were based on three diverse
factors:
(1) The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as determined by
the possession of the res (actual or constructive) and the nature
of the Navy's claim (adverse or merely colorable);
(2) The propriety of the Navy's actions including (a) set-off,
(b) retention of funds for the benefit of the IRS and the Depart-
ment of Labor, and (c) independent assessments of administra-
tive costs;
(3) The concept of sovereign immunity and the right of the
trustee to sue the Navy.
Judge Herbert Katz conceptualized the dismissal motion as fol-
lows:
If the Navy is entitled to hold those funds for those two other agencies
of the government [IRS and Labor Department] under some claim that it,
the Navy, as an agency, is holding for other agencies, thereby making the
whole matter one claim, then perhaps the Navy's claim would be more
than merely colorable9 and jurisdiction would not lie.
The Navy argues for this proposition on the theory that an agency or ad-
ministrative body of the executive branch are not juridical persons, but
are strictly representatives of the United States who may not be sued to
evade sovereign immunity. That therefore any suit against any agency is
a suit against the United States. Hence since a suit against the Navy, the
IRS or the Department of Labor is really a suit against the United States,
the Navy as one instrumentality of the United States may withhold funds
for the benefit of any other instrumentality of the United States and that
constitutes a substantial adverse claim to the funds so as to oust the
Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction.1 0
Because of actions by the IRS before Soledad filed its bank-
ruptcy petition, the above issues were not decided within the con-
text of In re Soledad. The IRS had fied tax liens totalling
$174,958.80 and had served a notice of levy" on Soledad before
7. For a discussion of the basis of summary jurisdiction, see text accompany-
ing notes 18-27 infra.
8. For a discussion of the distinction between adverse and merely colorable
claims, see notes 29-30 and accompanying text infra.
9. Id.
10. In re Soledad Enterprises, No. 75-1354, at 4-5 (S.D. Cal. March 20, 1978) (or-
der granting dismissal motion). The Navy's position is hereinafter referred to as
the "monolith" theory.
11. Notice of levy is notice and opportunity for a taxpayer to question the ex-
tent and validity of a tax claim against his property before such taxes become ir-
revocably fixed as a charge against his property. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 359 (1954).
Soledad filed its bankruptcy proceeding. The holding of Phelps v.
United States12 governed the outcome of In re Soledad. In
Phelps, the Supreme Court held that when the United States has
served a bankrupt taxpayer's assignee with a valid notice of levy,
it takes constructive custody of cash proceeds in the assignee's
possession. The Supreme Court concluded that neither the bank-
rupt nor the receiver can assert a claim to those proceeds.
Judge Katz concluded that the bankruptcy court lacked sum-
mary jurisdiction over the Navy, the holder of the funds, and
granted the Navy's motion to dismiss. The case was dismissed in
toto because the funds in question had been reduced to the con-
structive possession of the IRS and exceeded the amount of
Soledad's claim.
The holding in In re Soledad did not adversely affect the status
or effectiveness of the bankruptcy court. However, repercussions
of the future acceptance of the Government's position in Soledad
could greatly curtail both the power and jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court. If, in relation to a bankruptcy proceeding, a suit
against any governmental agency were to be construed as a suit
against the United States, then the United States could determine
the claims of various governmental agencies, including their pri-
ority and amount, outside the proceeding.
This Comment will examine the three issues raised in Soledad
beyond the factual limitations imposed by the notice of levy and
by the holding of Phelps. The analysis will center upon the Gov-
ernment's claim of sovereign immunity and will discuss its effect
on the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the right to set-off.
In conclusion, this Comment will call for an expansion of the




The Constitution grants Congress the power to create bank-
ruptcy courts and to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy
throughout the United States.'4 Although Congress could grant
complete and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy matters
to the bankruptcy courts, it has not done so.15 Instead, Congress
12. 421 U.S. 330 (1975).
13. See text accompanying notes 145.70 supra.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4: "The Congress shall have Power... To estab-
lish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States .... "
15. Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TuL. L. REV. 362, 370-71
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has granted the bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over ad-
ministrative bankruptcy matters, but only limited jurisdiction
over controversies between the bankruptcy trustee or receiver
and an adverse claimant to property.16 This concept of "limited
jurisdiction" has presented definitional problems and has been a
recurring source of litigation in the bankruptcy courts. It is
within this context that the Navy based its dismissal motion in In
re Soledad.
Congress, within the mandate of the Constitution, has struck a
balance between establishing uniform bankruptcy laws and leav-
ing matters of the state law to state courts. Although principles of
federal supremacy preclude separate state laws of bankruptcy,
the Bankruptcy Act in numerous instances expressly incorpo-
rates state law.17 Therefore, depending upon the extent of federal
jurisdiction over the subject matter, specific controversies may be
heard either only in a bankruptcy court, only in a state court, or
in either a federal bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy court or a state
court. In Soledad, federal jurisdiction existed because of both the
bankruptcy filing and the nature of the res and litigants involved.
The question facing the bankruptcy court was whether the facts
warranted summary or plenary treatment.
The differences between summary and plenary jurisdiction are
procedural rather than substantive, and the purpose is to expe-
dite matters that are considered routine in nature.18 Subject to
limited exceptions,19 the bankruptcy court exercises only sum-
mary jurisdiction.
Summary jurisdiction exists with respect to two main catego-
ries of matters: proceedings in bankruptcy and controversies aris-
ing in proceedings in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court always
(1942): "[Ilf Congress can pass a law creating legal rights under its legislative
power, the federal courts can be given jurisdiction by Congress to handle all litiga-
tion existing by reason thereof ......
16. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); In re Pennsylvania
Cent. Transp. Co., 520 F.2d 1388 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Continental Vending Mach.
Corp., 517 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1975); 11 U.S.C. §§ 11, 46 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976);
13 C. WrGrr, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3570
(1975); Mussman & Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy, 13 L. & CoNTEmP. PROB.
88 (1948).
17. For examples of the Bankruptcy Code incorporating state law, see Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 6, 70a(5), 70e, 11 U.S.C. §§ 24, l10a(5), 110e (1976).
18. 2 COLLER ON BANKauvrcy 1 23.02 (J. Moore ed. 14th ed. 1976).
19. Bankruptcy Act §§ 60b, 67, 70e(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96b, 107, l10e(3)(1976).
has summary jurisdiction over proceedings in bankruptcy,20 while
it has only limited summary jurisdiction over controversies aris-
ing in proceedings in bankruptcy.21
The adjective "summary" is appropriate to describe the proce-
dures in a bankruptcy hearing involving administrative or nonad-
versary matters.22 The procedure is summary only in the sense
that there are generally fewer delays in a bankruptcy court's de-
termination of a contested matter than in a comparable plenary
proceeding.23
Summary jurisdiction over controversies arising in proceedings
in bankruptcy generally turns on either possession of the res or
consent24 to summary jurisdiction by the adverse claimant. In
Soledad, the issue of possession surrounded both the earned but
unpaid funds owed to Soledad and held by the Navy and the na-
ture of the claims asserted to these funds by the IRS, the Depart-
ment of Labor, and the Navy.
Possession, for the purpose of summary jurisdiction, may be ac-
tual or constructive.25 Property in the debtor's possession at the
time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition is deemed to be in the
possession of the bankruptcy court.26 The trustee takes posses-
sion of all property within the actual control of the debtor. The
bankruptcy court may also assume jurisdiction even though the
bankrupt is out of possession if the third party in possession does
not have a bona fide claim to the res.
The central jurisdictional inquiry in cases of constructive pos-
session focuses on the nature of the claim asserted by the third
party. In Soledad, the trustee claimed that the bankruptcy court
had constructive possession over the earned but unpaid funds be-
20. Id. § 2a, 11 U.S.C. § Ila.
21. Id. § 23a, 11 U.S.C. § 46a.
22. E.g., taking the bankrupt estate into possession, liquidating the estate, and
deciding the relative rights of claimants.
23. Plenary jurisdiction is the type of jurisdiction exercised by the state and
the fed:zral district courts. A plenary proceeding is an ordinary civil action which
may be heard in any court of competent jurisdiction. Except for the right of jury
trial, the procedural differences between summary and plenary jurisdiction are
minimal.
24. The bankruptcy court may acquire jurisdiction through the actual or con-
structive consent of the adverse party. Although one could argue that the Govern-
ment in Soledad did consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction when the IRS
and the Department of Labor filed proofs of claim, this possibility was not dis-
cussed in any of the memoranda or opinions in Soledad. Therefore, this § will not
discuss consent as a basis for acquiring summary jurisdiction. For an analysis of
this area, see Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944); 2 COLWER ON BANKRUPTcY 23.08
(J. Moore ed. 14th ed. 1976).
25. See Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 107, 112 (1958).
26. Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160 (1938); In re Goldstein, Samuel-
son, Inc., 517 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1975).
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cause the nature of the Navy's claim was neither bona fide nor
sufficiently adverse to divest the court of jurisdiction. The mere
assertion of an adverse claim to the property in issue does not
ipso facto divest the bankruptcy court of summary jurisdiction.2 7
The bankruptcy court has the inherent power to determine
whether it has jurisdiction.2B If the adverse party holds the prop-
erty under a bona fide clailn, the bankruptcy court does not have
summary jurisdiction over an action by the trustee to recover the
property.2 9 However, if the claim is merely colorable,3 0 the bank-
ruptcy court is deemed to have jurisdiction on the theory that the
court holds constructive possession. Aside from the sovereign im-
munity issue, the critical issue in Soledad was the question of
whether the court had constructive possession sufficient for the
exercise of summary jurisdiction.
Set-Off
There are two distinct motives behind a court granting a debtor
the right to set-off. One motive is based on the belief that it is un-
fair to refuse the defendant this privilege, the other on the belief
that unmecessary lawsuits are a nuisance.31 However, within the
statutory limits defined by the set-off provision of the Bankruptcy
Code (section 68),32 the prerequisites of mutuality, provability,
27. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97, 98-99 (1944); Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U.S.
191, 194 (1926); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433 (1924); Note, 68
HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1955).
28. In Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433 (1924), the Court
stated: "As every court must have power to determine, in the first instance,
whether it has jurisdiction to proceed, the bankruptcy court has, in every case, ju-
risdiction to determine whether it has possession actual or constructive." Accord,
Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U.S. 191, 195 (1926); In re Todd Bldg. Corp., 172 F.2d
254, 257 (7th Cir. 1949); In re American Fidelity Corp., 28 F. Supp. 462, 467 (S.D.
Cal. 1939). See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy 23.07 (J. Moore ed. 14th ed. 1976).
29. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
30. In In re Western Rope & Mfg., 298 F. 926, 927 (8th Cir. 1924), affid, 271 U.S.
191 (1925), the court said as to the meaning of the word "colorable": "In our judg-
ment, the meaning of that word as used in this connection is that a claim alleged
to be adverse is only colorably so when, admitting the facts to be as alleged by the
claimant, there is, as a matter of law, no adverseness in the claim."
31. Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 562 (1916).
32. (a) In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate
of a bankrupt and a creditor the amount shall be stated and one debt shall
be set-off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid.
(b) A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any
debtor of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate and
allowable under subdivision g of section 93 of this title; or (2) was
purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the petition or within
and allowability must be met before the court will allow a party to
exercise a set-off.33
Several purposes have been ascribed to Congress in enacting
section 68. The Supreme Court has held that the basic rationale
was to prevent debtors of the bankrupt from acquiring claims
against the bankrupt and then to set them off.34 The Court later
stated that the import of section 68 was to prescribe a rule of set-
off upon distribution of the assets of the bankrupt's estate.35 A
final purpose, from the perspective of the claimant against the
bankrupt, is to avoid payment of a debt in full with a receipt in
return of only a percentage dividend.36
The thrust of the Navy's claim in Soledad centered on the right
to set-off funds earned by the bankrupt against alleged adminis-
trative costs and debts owed the IRS and the Department of La-
bor. It is important to note that only a few times within a
bankruptcy proceeding has one agency of the Government at-
tempted such an action for the benefit of another governmental
agency.3 7 However, before examining Soledad, an analysis of the
legislative history concerning mutual debts and credits will clarify
both the congressional intent surrounding this section of the
Bankruptcy Act and the propriety of the Navy's actions.
The concept of mutuality has appeared in the set-off section of
every bankruptcy act Congress has enacted.38 Congress first in-
troduced the provability requirement 39 in section 20 of the 1867
Act.40 That Act denied set-off claims when the debtor acquired
them after the filing of a voluntary petition.4 1
four months before such filing with a view to such use and with
knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was insolvent or had committed
an act of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1976).
33. For an in-depth analysis of these three factors, see Rochelle v. United
States, 521 F.2d 844, 850-53 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. Continental & Commercial Trust & Say. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
229 U.S. 435 (1913).
35. Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936).
36. United States v. Brunner, 282 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1960).
37. See, e.g., In re Brewster-Raymond Co., 344 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965); text ac-
companying notes 129-35 infra.
38. Morton, Creditor Setoffs in Business Reorganization and Relief Cases Un-
der the Bankruptcy Act, 50 Am. BANKR. L.J. 373, 375 (1976).
39. See Bankruptcy Act § 68b(1), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(1) (1976).
40. Act of Mar. 22, 1867, ch. 176, § 20, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
41.
[I]n all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the parties, the
account between them shall be stated, and one debt set off against the
other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid, but no set-off shall be
allowed of a claim in its nature not provable against the estate: Provided,
That no set-off shall be allowed in favor of any debtor to the bankrupt of a
claim purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the petition.
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The comprehensive Act of 1898 retained the basic provisions of
section 20 of the 1867 Act as section 68.42 The statute remains the
same today except for the addition of the allowability provisions
in the Chandler Act amendments of 1938,43 which were necessary
for clarification and coordination of section 5744 with the set-off
provision.45
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure follow the concept of judi-
cial economy espoused by set-offs through Rule 13(a), 46 which
mandates a single form of action for responsive assertion of any
claim as a compulsory counterclaim. The compulsory counter-
claim must be distinguished from the permissive counterclaim,
which gives the opposing party the option of asserting a counter-
claim not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. 47 The
Government in Soledad sought to erase this distinction by per-
mitting one agency to withhold funds for the benefit of another
agency.
It should be emphasized that section 68 does not create a new
right or enlarge jurisdiction.48 Section 68 merely codifies the
existence of the doctrine of set-off and provides for the enforce-
ment of the legal and equitable principles therein.49
The Government has maintained its right to apply due and un-
paid funds to the extinguishment of its obligations on other ac-
counts.5 0 The Government has the same right as any other
creditor at common law; this right is not dependent upon statu-
Id.
42. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 68, 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 108 (1976)).
43. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 57, 52 Stat. 840.
44. Bankruptcy Act § 57, 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1976).
45. S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1938).
46.
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
FED. PL CIrv. P. 13(A).
47. Id. 13(b).
48. Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523 (1913); Inter-State Nat'l Bank
v. Luther, 221 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1955). See generally 4 CoIJUaR ON BANKRuPrcY
68.02 (J. Moore ed. 14th ed. 1976).
49. Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1955).
50. The first case in which the Government asserted a right to set-off was Gra-
tiot v. United States, 40 U.S. (1 Pet.) 336 (1841).
tory authorization. 51 However, the bankruptcy set-off provision is
permissive rather than mandatory and cannot be invoked in cases
in which the general principles of set-off would not justify its
use.52 The entire matter is placed within the control of the bank-
ruptcy court, which exercises discretion upon the general princi-
ples of equity.
The set-off problem in Soledad involved the propriety of the
Navy's set-off. By holding money concededly owed to Soledad,
and thus effectively paying itself back for alleged set-offs due
from Soledad, the Navy created a preferential situation that vio-
lated section 68b(2).53 The proper procedure for the Navy would
have been to file a proof of claim as an unsecured creditor for the
trustee and the bankruptcy court to administer. In response to
this suggestion, the Navy claimed sovereign immunity.
Sovereign Immunity54
The most formidable obstacle the Navy placed before Soledad's
turnover motion5 5 was the time-honored concept of sovereign im-
munity. The principle that the Government cannot be sued by its
citizens without its consent5 6 is well established.57 The concept of
sovereign immunity allows Government defendants to set up an
almost impregnable defense that either effectively blocks any pos-
sible award by a court or diminishes any award granted to an in-
significant sum.
However, despite the doctrine's longstanding acceptance, 58 it
has come under increasingly heavy attack in recent years. Grow-
ing discontent with the concept has led to its legislative and judi-
cial abandonment in different areas and degrees in a number of
51. IA J. McBRDE, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 7.70 (1979).
52. In re Jonker Corp., 385 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D. Md. 1974).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2) (1976).
54. This discussion will be limited to the Government's purported immunity
from contract liability. No reference will be made concerning tort liability.
55. See note 6 supra.
56. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1972); United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
57. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
58. The rationale for the sovereign's immunity from suit has ancient origins.
In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan alluded to this rationale
where he stated in part that: "[t]he Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an As-
sembly, or one Man, is not Subject to the Civil Lawes." T. HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 313
(London 1651) (Macpherson ed. 1968). Justice Holmes explained the rationale
when he stated: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal con-
ception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
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states.59 In Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Services,60 the
Supreme Court of Iowa examined the various rationales that
other courts had utilized in abrogating the doctrine of sovereign
immunity within a contractual context. These rationales are sum-
marized as follows:
(1) Constitutional-by invoking sovereign immunity the Gov-
ernment is violating the contracting party's right of due process or
is taking property without just compensation.
(2) Legislative-a specific statute authorizes the Government
to participate in the contract in question.
(3) Actual Consent-the Government's action in voluntarily en-
tering into a contractual relationship bars a claim of sovereign im-
munity.
The Kersten court adopted the actual consent rationale but ar-
ticulated it in an implied waiver via contract format. The court
found that the Government had waived its right to assert sover-
eign immunity as a defense to the plaintiffs claim or, more sim-
ply, that the Government had impliedly consented to this suit.6 1
Judge Hilliard, commenting on a tax claim filed by the Govern-
ment in In re Ward,62 apparently adopted the same rationale as
the court in Kersten when he stated that: "Congress by the terms
of the Bankruptcy Act has conferred jurisdiction on the Bank-
ruptcy Court to entertain suits against the United States as it may
against any other creditor."63 The alternative would allow the
Government simultaneously to gather the benefits of the Act and
to recede under the veil of sovereign immunity. The inequity of
such a result may indicate that Congress intended to waive sover-
eign immunity when the United States acts as a claimant in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. 64
In Soledad, the Government attempted precisely what Judge
Hilliard had warned against. Through the IRS and the Depart-
ment of Labor, the Government was taking an active role in the
bankruptcy proceedings as an unsecured creditor. However,
through the Navy, the Government was invoking sovereign immu-
nity and an absolute right to the funds as an adverse claimant.
59. See generally K. DAVIS, ADmNISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 25.00
(1976 & Supp. 1977); 2 K. DAVIS, AD=NISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.00 (Supp.
1970); 3 K. DAVIS, AD1mISTRATrVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01 (1958 & Supp. 1965).
60. 207 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Iowa 1973).
61. Id.
62. 131 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1955).
63. Id. at 396.
64. Id.
Despite the inequity of this situation, the prevailing law today
does not prohibit it. Because the Government's claim of sover-
eign immunity effectively bars any consideration of jurisdiction or
set-off, In re Soledad will be analyzed in this sovereign immunity-
oriented context.
ANALYSIS
Judge Jenkins, in a paper presented to the Southwest Seminar
for Bankruptcy Referees in 1969,65 posed a hypothetical question
strikingly similar to the Soledad facts.66 In reviewing the relevant
case law at that time, Judge Jenkins concluded that although the
bankruptcy court may find facts and points of law stating that the
sovereign should disgorge funds to which it had a merely color-
able claim, the court "has no express power to tell the sovereign it
must disgorge."67
Judge Jenkins' conclusion should be contrasted with two Su-
preme Court statements. In Pepper v. Litton,68 the Court de-
clared that in the exercise of jurisdiction the bankruptcy court
should apply the principles and values of equity jurisprudence.
In Katchen v. Landy,69 the Court declared that by securing the
administration and settlement of the bankrupt's estate without a
time-consuming and expensive plenary hearing, the judiciary was
effectively carrying out the congressional intent behind the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
In the following analysis, this Comment will focus upon the det-
rimental effect of sovereign immunity upon the equitable purpose
and relief-oriented philosophy behind the Bankruptcy Act. This
Comment will discuss how the benefits of judicial economy, lower
costs, expeditious relief, equity, and equality before the law are as
relevant in dealing with the Government in bankruptcy cases as
65. Jenkins, Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to Deal with Claims of the
Sovereign, Objections to such Claims and Counterclaims Against the Sovereign, 43
REF. J. 104 (1969).
66. Id. at 107:
If now, instead of Mr. Katchen, we have the United States of America.
And instead of Landy as trustee, we have one of our own. And the claim
is for taxes, or S.B.A. money or something comparable. And the Trustee
asserts 57(g) objections characterizing the claims of the sovereign as "im-
proper" and asks that the sovereign United States be ordered to disgorge.
And the sovereign United States files a motion to dismiss asserting-
(1) The counterclaim of the Trustee is beyond the summary jurisdic-
tion of the court and requires a separate plenary action.
(2) The counterclaim violates the sovereign immunity of the United
States.
What then-what then?
67. Id. at 108 (emphasis original).
68. 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939).
69. 382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1965).
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they are in dealing with any other creditor. Because the recently
enacted Bankruptcy Act reform70 has mooted some of the juris-
dictional and set-off issues raised in In re Soledad, the following
deliberation will focus upon the Government's claim of sovereign
immunity which, for the first time, is given statutory considera-
tion in the new bankruptcy legislation.71
The general policy of the Bankruptcy Act outlined above is sup-
plemented by the provisions of section 68a,72 which in effect de-
clares a statutory policy to settle all permissible claims or
accounts "between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor."73 Al-
though the law is clear in granting the bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion to decide the validity of any defenses or set-offs of non-
sovereign claims, 74 the courts are divided as to sovereign claims. 75
Sovereign Claims
The Government's Case-Issues Raised and Answered
It is important to note that In re Soledad is factually distin-
guishable from all the cases discussed below. In Soledad, the
Government, not the bankrupt, asserted the right to set-off. Also,
most of the other cases dealt with only one agency of the Govern-
ment while Soledad involved multiple Government claimants.
Finally, the Government's "monolith" theory76 and claim of sov-
ereign immunity in Soledad were clouded because the IRS and
wage and labor claimants filed proofs of claim while the Navy con-
tended that it was an adverse claimant.
In re Monongahela Rye Liquors77 is a landmark case which is
often cited for the Government's position that there is no author-
ity for set-offs against the claims of a sovereign. The Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania filed proofs of claim for taxes due from a
liquor dealer who had petitioned for reorganization under chapter
70. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. See text accompanying
notes 145-70 infra.
71. See text accompanying notes 145-70 infra.
72. 11 U.S.C. 108(a) (1976).
73. See generally Cumberland Glass Mfg. v. DeWitt & Co., 237 U.S. 447, 454-56
(1915).
74. Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 238-39 (1935); In re Barnett, 12 F.2d 73,
81 (2d Cir. 1926); In re Germain, 144 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Cal. 1956); In re Ward, 131
F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1955); In re Nathan, 98 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (S.D. Cal. 1951); 2
COLTER ON BANxmuvTcY 23.08[6] (J. Moore ed. 14th ed. 1976).
75. See text accompanying notes 76-144 infra.
76. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
77. 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944).
X of the Bankruptcy Act. The trustee in bankruptcy counter-
claimed for money due the bankrupt for liquor sold to the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board, a state agency.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the set-off
provision of section 68a did not give rise to an independent claim
against a sovereign.78 The court noted that a set-off is based upon
an independent cause of action because it arises from a transac-
tion apart from the transactions giving rise to the primary claim.
Although a compulsory counterclaim must be asserted in the
same action as a primary claim,79 set-offs may be asserted as per-
missive counterclaims8 O in a secondary hearing. The court ex-
plained that because a set-off is based upon different subject
matter than the primary claim, it is the same as an independent
suit against the sovereign, and the sovereign may be sued only
with its consent.8 1 However, the court acknowledged that when
the sovereign submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, it re-
mains vulnerable to any adverse claims that may have arisen
from the same transaction giving rise to its suit.8 2 The court con-
cluded by differentiating between recoupment 83 (the defendant's
right in the above situation) and set-off.
In re Monongahela Rye Liquors84 spawned a series of cases
which support the Government's position in Soledad. These will
now be examined chronologically. In Danning v. United States,85
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit gave the Government
its strongest support for denying a creditor affirmative relief via
sovereign immunity.86 The issue in Danning was whether a bank-
ruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear a trustee's counterclaim for
affirmative relief arising out of the same transaction as the claim
filed by the Government in the bankruptcy proceedings. The
plaintiff properly indicated that if a private individual were a
party claimant, the court would have jurisdiction to render a judg-
ment against the claimant on a counterclaim.8 7 However, the
78. Id. at 869.
79. FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a).
80. FED. R. Crv. P. 13(b).
81. 141 F.2d at 869.
82. Id.
83. "[R] ecoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of
the transaction upon which the action is grounded." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S.
247, 262 (1935). A set-off generally deals with mutual debts or credits arising from
different transactions. See generally 4 COLLIER ON BAtNaiu'rcy 68.03 (J. Moore
ed. 14th ed. 1976).
84. 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944).
85. 259 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911 (1959).
86. It is interesting to note that the Government did not cite Danning in
Soledad.
87. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 326 (1965); Danning v. United States,
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Government claimed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
barred the assumption of jurisdiction and thus mandated a dis-
missal. The Danning court agreed with the Government and
found that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction.88 The court
held that the judiciary does not have the power to create a "con-
sent to be sued" when Congress has not expressly enunciated
such consent.89
Despite the absolute nature of its holding in Danning, the court
discussed two other points. First, the court held that in certain
situations90 section 68a includes the United States as a creditor.9 '
Second, the court stated that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
may not have been favored by the test of time and may be wan-
ing.92
United States v. Owens,93 the next case in the Monongahela
line of cases, presented another Soledad-type fact situation.
Bruce Construction Corp. was owed monies from contracts per-
formed for the United States. Before the corporation received
payment, it went into chapter X reorganization proceedings. Ac-
cordingly, the Government ascertained that there was a need for
a set-off because of a substantial amount of unpaid taxes owed by
the bankrupt. The chapter X proceedings amounted to a turnover
order directing the United States to make a final disposition of the
funds in question.,
The Government made two claims against the trustee's request
for the unpaid funds. First, the Government contended that the
action could be brought only in the Court of Claims.94 Second, as
in Soledad, the Government claimed that it had an adverse claim
and that the court did not possess summary jurisdiction over the
funds.95 In reversing the trial court, the Fifth Circuit held that the
Government's claim was bona fide and deserved plenary treat-
259 F.2d 305, 308-11 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911 (1959); Gendel, Juris-
diction of a Referee in Bankruptcy to Render Affirmative Judgment on a Counter-
claim in Favor of a Trustee, 26 S. CA. L. REV. 167 (1953); text accompanying notes
47-48 supra.
88. 259 F.2d at 309-10.
89. "Only Congress has the power to grant jurisdiction over the sovereign."
Id. at 309.
90. E.g., tax claims.
91. See United States v. Roth, 164 F.2d 575, 578 (2d Cir. 1948).
92. 259 F.2d at 309.
93. 329 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1964).
94. Id. at 678.
95. Id. at 679.
ment. The appellate court appeared hesitant to subject the Gov-
ernment's funds to a summary turnover order unless the trustee
could prove either that the bankrupt had actual or constructive
possession or that the Government's claim was merely colorable.
The appellate ruling in Owens is suspect for two reasons. First,
because the Government did not file its tax claim until after the
debtor had filed its reorganization petition, the funds had already
passed into the constructive possession of the bankruptcy court
when the petition was fied. This constructive possession allowed
the court to invoke summary jurisdiction to determine the rights
of the claimants.9 6 Second, Phelps v. United States,97 the case
that ultimately determined In re Soledad,98 expressly required
the notice of levy and tax lien of the IRS to be issued before the
bankruptcy court assumed jurisdiction. Because the Govern-
ment's actions were post-filing, Owens cannot serve as precedent
for Soledad.
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1346 contains the basic congressional ex-
ceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine.9 9 The interpretive
case law holds that a suit will be treated as against the sovereign
and thus as requiring express consent when the judgment sought
would expend itself on the public treasury or would interfere with
public administration'0 0 whether it is in the form of an original ac-
tion, a set-off, or a counterclaim.' 0l
The courts have criticized 0 2 and circumvented the doctrine of
sovereign immunity notwithstanding the congressional authority
96. See generally In re Goldman, 5 F. Supp. 973, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
97. 421U.S. 330 (1975).
98. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
99. The two basic congressional exceptions to the sovereign immunity doc-
trine are the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1976), and the Federal Tort Claims
Act, id. § 1346(b). Other statutory exceptions include id. §§ 1347, 1353, 2410; 43
U.S.C. § 666a (1976).
100. St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mo.
1975); United States v. Pennsylvania Envt'l Hearing Bd., 377 F. Supp. 545 (M.D. Pa.
1974); Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Ky. 1973),
affid, 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 971 (1975); Central La.
Elec. Co. v. Rural Electrification Adm'r, 236 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. La. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966).
101. Chrome Plate, Inc. v. Distict Dir. of Internal Revenue, 442 F. Supp. 1023
(W.D. Tex. 1977); United States v. 597.75 Acres of Land, More or Less, 241 F. Supp.
796 (W.D. La. 1965).
102. E.g., Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. Supp. 528, 535
(M.D. Tenn. 1973) (sovereign immunity still exists even though it "should be abol-
ished because it lacks a rational basis"); Hartke v. Federal Aviation Adm'r, 369 F.
Supp. 741, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("sovereign immunity [as] contrary to modern con-
cept that individuals should have remedy for every legal wrong"); Glenn v. United
States, 129 F. Supp. 914, 918 (S.D. Cal. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 231 F.2d 884
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 926 (1956) ("the moribund doctrine of sovereign
immunity").
[VOL. 16: 423, 1979] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
implicit within section 1346. For example, a court has used the
Bankruptcy Act to retain jurisdiction after the trustee paid a divi-
dend to the United States. 0 3 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit denied the Government's claim for with-
holding income tax in United States v. Kalishman.0 4  The
Kalishman court held that in regard to bankruptcy matters, the
Bankruptcy Act takes precedence over all other statutes and gov-
erns whenever a conflict may exist.105 The court concluded, as
did Judge Katz in Soledad, that the scheme of distribution to
creditors in section 64106 must be upheld regardless of the other
statutory preferences.
The Bankrupt's Case-A Plea for Rationality
Despite the longstanding acceptance of the Monongahela line of
cases, 0 7 several circuits seem to agree that legislative authority
exists for set-offs against the claims of the sovereign. 08 In United
States v. Roth,109 the Second Circuit applied the set-off provision
of section 68a to a tax claim ified by the Government. The court,
in granting one of plaintiff's two asserted set-offs, predicated its
decision on the Chandler Act amendments," 0 which granted con-
gressional authorization for set-offs against certain claims of the
United States."'
The Roth decision is generally discussed without any reference
to the decision of the district court," 2 which was modified on ap-
peal. The district court opinion presents many arguments subse-
quently accepted by the appellate court and applicable in
103. In re Madden, 388 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1975).
104. 346 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1004 (1966).
105. Id. at 517. Accord, Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224
U.S. 152 (1912); Gwilliam v. United States, 519 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Dolard,
519 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1975). Contra, Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District Dir. of Internal
Revenue, 442 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (court stated that "if there is a
clash between the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and the principle of sovereign
immunity, it is the Bankruptcy Act that must yield"). See also United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); Safeway Portland E.F.C.U. v. FDIC, 506 F.2d 1213,
1216 (9th Cir. 1974).
106. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
107. See text accompanying notes 84-98 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 109-36 infra.
109. 164 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1948).
110. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
111. United States v. Roth, 164 F.2d 575, 578 (2d Cir. 1948).
112. In re Flato, 68 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), modified sub nom. United
States v. Roth, 164 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1948).
Soledad. The district court declared that it was "a manifest ab-
surdity"1 ' 3 for the Government to contend that section 68 did not
apply to the Government because it was not specifically men-
tioned in that Code section.114 Furthermore, to the extent that
the Bankruptcy Act requires the United States to file proofs of
claim, Congress "must be held to have authorized suit [and set-
offs] against the United States in the bankruptcy court."115 The
alternative would result in undue delay and a waste of judicial
time by forcing a set-off to be adjudicated in a subsequent hear-
ing.
The Roth decision also created a precedent that has been fol-
lowed by several circuits." 6 The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit upheld the doctrine of sovereign immunity in In re
Greenstreet, Inc.,117 by stating that the filing of a claim in bank-
ruptcy proceedings does not constitute a consent to an affirmative
judgment on the counterclaim. However, by declaring that the
bankruptcy court does have jurisdiction to determine the bank-
ruptcy trustee's counterclaim to the extent that it serves to set-off,
decrease, or extinguish the Government's unsecured claim,"18 the
court gave implicit recognition to the Roth rationale. As in
Soledad, the bankruptcy court should have jurisdiction to deter-
mine a bankrupt's claim for earned but unpaid funds against the
Government's asserted set-off of assets within the constructive
possession of the bankruptcy court.
.A district court case in Colorado, In re Ward,119 expressly
granted the bankruptcy trustee an affirmative judgment against
the United States on an amount due from the Government that
was over and above the Government's duly filed tax claim. On re-
consideration, the Government raised the issue of sovereign im-
munity. Judge Hilliard, in a well-reasoned and articulated
opinion, 120 stated that the Bankruptcy Act places the United
States in the same position as any other claimant or creditor.12 1
Therefore, Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity when
the United States is participating as a claimant in bankruptcy pro-
113. Id. at 638.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See text accompanying notes 117-36 infra.
117. 209 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1954).
118. Id. at 667.
119. 131 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1955).
120. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
121. Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1976) (this statute, although not
quite treating the United States as any other creditor, places the Government in
distinct categories in subsections (4) and (5). This placement serves to negate the
Government's claim of sovereign immunity).
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ceedings.1
2 2
Citing Roth, Judge Hilliard continued his analysis by stating
that section 68a was applicable and that by filing an unsecured
claim the Government subjected itself to an adverse judgment if
the trustee could establish that the Government was indeed in-
debted to the bankrupt. Ward exemplifies the Roth line of cases
in holding that the Bankruptcy Code per se and section 68a in
particular are evidence of congressional intent to hold the Gov-
ernment responsible for its actions in dealing with creditors and
debtors alike. 123 If this were not the case, the Government would
be able simultaneously to gain the financial benefits of a creditor
in a bankruptcy proceeding and to withdraw under the cloak of
sovereign immunity.124
The Roth rationale found further expression in In re Techcraft,
Inc. 125 Anticipating Phelps,126 the district court concluded that by
failing to make demand on a tax claim prior to bankruptcy, the
Government could not properly issue a lien by assessing its claim
after the debtor's bankruptcy petition was filed. Furthermore,
the Techcraft court, citing Roth and Danning, disregarded
Monongahela to hold expressly that "an order disallowing the tax
claims unless the amount due on the contract is paid over would
not constitute an affirmative judgment against the United
States."2 7 Therefore, the Government's payment of the above
claim would not constitute an affirmative judgment, 2 8 and the de-
fense of sovereign immunity would not be available to the Gov-
ernment.
The jurisdictional and set-off issues in Soledad, with respect to
sovereign immunity, were foreshadowed by In re Brewster-Ray-
mond Co.129 In Brewster-Raymond, the Sixth Circuit heard an
appeal from a judgment of the district court denying the United
States the right to recover certain tax penalties and interest
thereon from the bankrupt. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
122. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
123. 131 F. Supp. at 395-96.
124. Id.
125. 177 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The fact situation in Techcraft is closely
analogous to Soledad.
126. Phelps v. United States, 421 U.S. 330 (1975).
127. 177 F. Supp. at 792 (emphasis added).
128. For an explanation of how "affirmative judgment" is defined in this Com-
ment, see text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
129. 344 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965).
petition, the bankrupt had been engaged in the performance of a
contract for the Navy. As in Techcraft,130 a substantial sum of
money became due to the bankrupt before the bankruptcy peti-
tion was filed. Although the court ordered the Navy to pay the
amount of its indebtedness to the bankruptcy trustee, the Gov-
ernment asserted a right to set-off these funds against the alleged
tax penalties. The issue facing the Sixth Circuit was whether the
Government's claim could be legally collected or set-off against
the bankrupt estate. Instead of following the rationale of the
Techcraft court,131 the Sixth Circuit held that the funds were an
asset of the bankruptcy estate and that the bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction to decide any alleged adverse claims.132
Thus, Techcraft and Brewster-Raymond provide the bankruptcy
court with alternative yet viable means to reach the same juris-
dictional objective against the Government's claim of sovereign
immunity-that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over earned
but unpaid funds of the bankrupt when he files his bankruptcy
petition before the Government issues a tax lien or notice of
levy.133
In re United General Wood Products Corp.134 continued the
Roth series of cases and extended Brewster-Raymond in holding
that the bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction over a fund
derived from the debtor's accounts receivable. The court declared
that in acquiring jurisdiction, a debtor is deemed to have con-
structive possession of any asset in which he has a merely color-
able interest when the actual possessor does not assert any claim
to it. Third-party claims to the same asset do not affect the juris-
dictional issue.1 35
The fact situation in General Wood may be analogized with that
in Soledad. The Navy in Soledad was holding funds both for it-
self and for the benefit of the IRS and the Department of Labor.
According to General Wood, the Navy was not asserting any self-
interest in these third-party funds. Therefore, Soledad was in
constructive possession of at least that portion of the money
earmarked for the IRS and the Department of Labor.
The rationale of the Roth line of cases with respect to the sover-
eign's claim of set-off is sound doctrine and is applicable in
Soledad. If a sovereign seeks the court's assistance, the princi-
130. 177 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
131. See text accompanying notes 125-28 supra.
132. See In re Brewster-Raymond Co., 344 F.2d 903, 909 (6th Cir. 1965) (citing
Bankruptcy Act § 2a(2), (7), 11 U.S.C. § 11a(2), (7) (1976)).
133. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
134. 483 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973).
135. Id. at 976.
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ples of law and equity imply that it should also subject itself to
the court's jurisdiction with respect to a counterclaim or set-off
properly asserted as a defense in a similar suit between non-sov-
ereign litigants.136 The Government should recognize the con-
gressional intent behind the Bankruptcy Act and its recent
reform and the trend toward finding jurisdiction evidenced by the
rationale of the Roth line of cases.
In re Soledad-The Case in Perspective
Soledad presented two sharply defined and antagonistic pro-
positions for judicial review. First, the trustee argued that, for
bankruptcy purposes, the Navy's refusal to turn over money be-
cause of claims by the Department of Labor and the IRS was un-
warranted irrespective of the Government's general right to set-
off claims against it outside of bankruptcy.37 Second, the Gov-
ernment's argument presented a "monolith" theory by which any
claim made against the bankrupt by any governmental agency
would divest the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to hear the mat-
ter.138
If the Government's theory had been accepted, the Bankruptcy
Code could possibly be deemed irrelevant in determining priority
claims and in other administrative procedures regarding the es-
tates of bankrupts. A further discussion of Bankruptcy Act sec-
tion 64 will demonstrate the potential danger of the Government's
advocated theory.
Section 64 sets out a definitive scheme of distribution by break-
ing down categories of debts for priority of payment.139 The sec-
136. United States v. National City Bank, 83 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1936); Seligson
& King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy (pt. 2), 36 REF. J. 73, 76 (1962).
137. In Supplemental Brief for Defendants, In re Soledad Enterprises, No. 75-
1354 (S.D. Cal. March 20, 1978), the Government cited a series of non-bankruptcy
cases for the proposition that the Government, within a bankruptcy context, could
set-off funds to satisfy claims of different agencies under its purview. These cases
included: United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Pacific Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); DiS-
ilvestro v. United States, 405 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Cohen, 389
F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1967); Project Map, Inc. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1375 (Ct. Cl.
1973); Algonac Mfg. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241 (Ct. Cl. 1970); T.F. Scholes, Inc.
v. United States, 357 F.2d 963 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
138. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
139. The priority of payment in Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1976), pro-
ceeds as follows:
(1) Costs and expenses of administration,
(2) Wages due to workmen, servants, employees, etc.,
tion states in effect that debts having priority in advance of the
payment of dividends to creditors must be paid in full out of the
bankrupt estate. Section 64 does not state that all debts owed the
United States are to be paid in a uniform manner. Rather, it ex-
plicitly delineates and differentiates between tax debts owed
agencies such as the IRS and the Department of Labor and debts
other than for taxes owed the United States. Thus, if the Govern-
ment's monolith position were accepted and the United States
were construed as a single entity encompassing all its subparts
and agencies, then section 64 would be irrelevant when the bank-
ruptcy court made administrative decisions regarding priority
debts.
The proofs of claim140 filed by the laborers, the materialmen,
and the IRS further evidence the necessity of the bankruptcy
court administering the bankrupt's estate. Only by ignoring sec-
tions 68 and 64 and the fact that proofs of claim had been filed
could the bankruptcy court have upheld the Government's posi-
tion. Furthermore, the Government's claim of lack of jurisdiction
is inconsistent with the primary power of the bankruptcy court to
determine claims against the estate, including claims of the Gov-
ernment and its agencies.
One further case illustrates the bankruptcy court's right to ad-
minister the Soledad estate. In In re Jonker Corp.141 the district
court decided an issue concerning the Government's ability to
set-off certain funds in its possession against a claim. After the
adjudication of bankruptcy, the court determined that the Army
held a substantial sum of money owed the bankrupt under its
government contract. Despite the bankruptcy court's scheduled
order of distribution, the Comptroller General ordered that the
Army-held money be distributed to the federal agencies that filed
claims against the bankrupt. These federal agencies, including
the IRS, received the money in accordance with the Comptroller
General's instructions.
The bankruptcy court determined that it was not bound by the
(3) Reasonable costs and expenses of creditors in pursuing claims,
(4) Taxes which are due to the United States or any state or subdivision
thereof,
(5) Debts other than for taxes owing to any person, including the United
States.
140. A proof of claim is the mere statement of the creditor to the effect that the
alleged bankrupt owes the creditor a debt. An unsecured creditor must file such a
claim to enable him to participate in creditors' meetings and in the division of the
bankrupt estate. Thus, by filing their proofs of claim, the laborers, materialmen,
and the IRS (and thereby the Government) indicated their interest in having the
bankruptcy court administer the Soledad estate.
141. 385 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974).
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Comptroller General's distribution order and ordered that the
money be set-off against a tax claim. The United States appealed.
The Jonker court, citing Kalishman'42 and Brewster-Raymond,143
stated that none of the cases advanced by the United States in-
volved bankruptcy matters. 44 The court concluded that the
Bankruptcy Act supersedes conflicting statutes and case law, in-
cluding the determination of priorities.
Without the Phelps issue, the trustee in bankruptcy for Soledad
would have successfully contended that the bankruptcy court had
constructive possession of the funds held by the Navy. Soledad
was a bankruptcy case; it required administration of claims and
analysis under sections 68 and 64. The contracting officer of the
Navy had no valid or legal authority to administer the claims as-
sessed against Soledad after the bankruptcy petition was filed.
Without the IRS's tax lien and notice of levy, the bankruptcy
court had the jurisdiction to mandate the turnover of the earned
but unpaid funds owed to Soledad.
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE RESTRUCTuRED---THE 1978 BANKRUPTCY
REFORM AND ITS EFFECT UPON IN RE SOLEDAD
From 1973 to 1978 Congress studied a comprehensive revision of
the bankruptcy system and its substantive law.14 5 On October 6,
1978, this congressional research culminated in the passage of the
first major substantive Bankruptcy Code reform in forty years.
When President Carter signed the legislation on November 6,
1978, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was finally put to rest. The fol-
lowing discussion will analyze the probable effect of the new Act
on the facts in In re Soledad.
The new Act accomplishes significant reform in the bankruptcy
courts.146 It improves the administration of bankruptcy cases1 47
142. 346 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966). See text ac-
companying notes 104-06 supra.
143. 344 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965). See text accompanying notes 129-35 supra.
144. 385 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D. Md. 1974). See also note 137 supra.
145. See Anderson, A Digest of Broader Perspectives for Bankruptcy Court
Reforms, 81 Com. L.J. 240 (1976); Anderson, Bankruptcy Court Reforms Through
the Looking Glass, 82 CoM. L.J. 257 (1977); Drake, Proposed Bankruptcy Legisla-
tion of 1977, 13 GA. ST. B.J. 113 (1977); Klee, Congress and the Bankruptcy Act of
1976, 61 A.B.A. J. 1268 (1975); Trost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa
1977, 33 Bus. LAWv. 489 (1978).
146. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified
as 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160).
147. Id. § 101 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 15303-15345).
by elevating the status of bankruptcy judges,148 by initiating the
pilot United States Trustee program,149 and by consolidating for-
mer chapters X, XI, and XII into a single reorganization chapter
for all cases.' 50 The new Act's effect upon the Soledad issues of
jurisdiction, set-off, and sovereign immunity is significant. How-
ever, the new Act also injects an element of confusion that will
wear off only through judicial review and clarification.
The section of the new Act dealing with jurisdiction151 vests the
bankruptcy court with subject matter jurisdiction over all contro-
versies affecting the debtor or his estate. The Act erases the dis-
tinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction and renders
possession of the res irrelevant whether possession is actual or
constructive. Furthermore, if a bankruptcy should arise in an ac-
tion pending in another court, a removal procedure similar to the
federal removal procedure 52 is available to remove the action to
the bankruptcy court.153 Generally, the jurisdictional changes
substantially shorten the time and costs involved in litigation.
The set-off section of the new Act 54 was constructed primarily
to clarify past confusion concerning bank set-offs and reorganiza-
tions rather than straight bankruptcies.155 Section 553156 reduces
the pre-bankruptcy time period in which the debtor may safely
transfer or purchase assets and still utilize a set-off from four
months to ninety days. It also omits the knowledge or notice re-
quirement in the old Code's section 68b(2). The new Act pre-
serves the basic theory and concept of set-off previously
discussed.157
The new Code, with some minor adjustments and redefinitions,
retains basically intact the priority of claims under section 64 of
the 1898 Act.58 It is important to note that the new Code signifi-
cantly changes the tax priority,59 breaking it down into five cate-
148. Id. § 201(a) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160).
149. Id. § 224(a) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589).
150. Id. § 101 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 151102-151163).
151. Id. § 241(a) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1471).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
153. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified
as 28 U.S.C. § 1478).
154. Id. § 101 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 553).
155. Trost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977, 33 Bus. LAW.
489, 519-20 (1978).
156. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified as
11 U.S.C. § 553).
157. See text accompanying notes 31-53 supra.
158. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified as
11 U.S.C. § 507).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (4) (1976).
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gories concerning the type of tax, the relative time at which the
tax was assessed, and the age of the tax claim.160
The expansive grant of jurisdiction in the new Code would have
been of great import to In re Soledad. Because the 1978 Act extin-
guishes possession as a basis of jurisdiction,161 the Navy's adverse
claim over the res would have been of no consequence. The only
question for the bankruptcy court to decide, because it would
have had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation,
would have been whether its jurisdiction extended over and be-
yond the Government's claim of sovereign immunity. The 1978
Act marks the first time that the Bankruptcy Code has dealt ex-
pressly with the issue of sovereign immunity.16 2
The grounds for the waiver of sovereign immunity announced
in the new Code appear to apply directly to the Soledad fact situ-
ation. Subsections (a) and (b) of section 106163 would seem to
have given the trustee in Soledad sufficient authority to assert
and gain a favorable ruling on a motion for summary judgment or
directed verdict. However, section 106(c)1 64 and the accompany-
ing congressional comments165 make this statute confusing and
unpredictable.166
160. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified as
11 U.S.C. § 507(a), (b)).
161. Id. § 241(a) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1471).
162. Id. § 101 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 106).
163.
(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immu-
nity with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is prop-
erty of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence
out of which such governmental unit's claim arose.
(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a gov-
ernmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property
of the estate.
Id. (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), (b)).
164.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and
notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity-
(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor", "entity", or
"governmental unit" applies to governmental units; and
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a
provision binds governmental units.
Id. (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 106(c)).
165. 124 CONG. REC. S17407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini);
id. at H11091 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
166. Telephone Interview with Thomas P. Breen, Counsel for the Subcommit-
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary
(Oct. 19, 1978).
In reference to section 106(c), the congressional comment
states that "[t]he provision is included to comply with the re-
quirement in case law that an express waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is required in order to be effective."167 Therefore, despite the
apparent grant of the necessary jurisdiction and power to over-
come the Government's assertion of sovereign immunity in sec-
tion 106(a) and (b), Congress also has stated that the sovereign
must expressly waive its immunity for section 106 to be effective.
The sovereign has no motivating reason to waive its immunity in
a Soledad-type fact situation: The Government could only lose
money by waiving immunity.168
The inconsistency between the statute and the congressional
comment cannot be resolved. By enacting section 106 with the
above explanatory comment, Congress in one breath destroyed
and resurrected the doctrine of sovereign immunity. There are
three possible interpretations the bankruptcy courts could formu-
late to resolve this conflict:
(1) The courts could read the statute without referenqe to the
congressional comment and prohibit the Government from assert-
ing sovereign immunity in a bankruptcy forum.
(2) The courts could read the statute with reference to the con-
gressional comment and universally allow the Government to as-
sert sovereign immunity whenever it is not expressly waived.
(3) A split of authority between (1) and (2) could arise with
each bankruptcy judge reading the statute according to his own
interpretation.
The last possibility would prove disastrous. Forum shopping,
according to the bankruptcy judges' prior decisions, would cause
the courts to lose both judicial integrity and public respect. The
second possibility would leave the law in approximately its pres-
ent state, allowing the Government to continue to assert its mono-
lith theory.169 Only the first possibility would permit the debtor
adequate relief and a fresh start and continue to hold the Govern-
ment accountable for its actions.
Although the possibility exists that the bankruptcy court will
abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity before the October 1,
1979, implementation of the new Code, such action is doubtful.
However, the opportunity will soon be at hand for the bankruptcy
167. 124 CONG. REC. S17407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini);
id. at H11091 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
168. Although this congressional comment relates expressly only to § 106(c), its
import would most probably limit the overall effectiveness of § 106 (a), (b).
169. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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courts to utilize the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 7 0
and to remove forever this doctrine's presence from bankruptcy
proceedings. By recognizing the purpose and philosophy of the
Bankruptcy Act and the judicial concern evidenced by the ration-
ale of the Roth line of cases, the bankruptcy courts will hopefully
put the Government in the same position as all other unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.
CONCLUSION
In re Soledad will be remembered more for what it might have
held than for its actual holding, The Government's advocacy of a
monolith theory, by which any claim by any governmental agency
against the bankrupt would divest the bankruptcy court of juris-
diction, threatened the administrative structure upon which the
bankruptcy court rests. However, because of the filing of a tax
lien and a notice of levy by the IRS, the propriety of the govern-
ment's monolith theory was never adjudicated.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Act addresses the issue of sovereign im-
munity and negates the possibility of a monolith theory of govern-
ment. However, the congressional comments surrounding this
statute provide a source of confusion and uncertainty, which
leave the issue of sovereign immunity in doubt. To resolve this
state of confusion, the decisions of the bankruptcy courts inter-
preting this statute should ignore the congressional comments
and uphold the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.
JACK RAYmOND COHEN
170. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified as
11 U.S.C. § 106).

